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JO E L W. EASTMAN

Entrepreneurship and Obsolence
Owen W . Davis, Jr .
and
The Katahdin Charcoal Iron Company
1876-1890

When Owen W. Davis, Jr ., took charge of the Katahdin
Iron Works in 1876, he was representative o f the best of
the new managerial class which arose in the years
following the Civil War. Davis was bright, imaginative, and
aggressive, and yet he was able to maintain excellent
relations with both labor and stockholders. However, he
had applied his many talents to an obsolescent industry charcoal iron making - and, more particularly, to an
antiquated plant in a remote and underdeveloped section
of the United States - northern Maine. Despite some
remarkable entrepreneurial and technical achievements,
Davis - like many other nineteenth century businessmen
in declining industries - was bound to fail.
The Katahdin Iron Works had been constructed in 1845
to produce pig iron from an ore deposit discovered on the
side of a small mountain in the Maine woods fifty miles
north of Bangor, the booming lumber capital of the East,
located at the head of tide on the Penobscot River. The
iron works, the village built to support it, and the township
o f land which surrounded it had been acquired in 1846 by
David Pingree of Salem, Massachusetts, a wealthy
merchant turned timberlands investor, who had accepted
the property in payment o f a debt. The iron works ceased
operations after ten years, plagued by two major problems
which Pingree had been unable to solve: the high cost of
transporting the heavy pig iron by wagon to the port of
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Bangor; and a puzzling smelting problem which produced
pig iron of widely varying quality and gave the product a
bad reputation in its main market, Boston, Massachusetts.1
Pingree died in 1863, and after several efforts to
purchase the iron works and put it back into operation
failed, it was finally acquired by a group of businessmen
headed by Thomas N. Egery, a Bangor iron founder,
which incorporated in 1868 as the Piscataquis Iron Works
Company.2 Egery and his associates undertook a major
effort to have a branch railroad line extended to the iron
works, but when it failed, they apparently decided to
resume production without it.3 In 1873, the old stone blast
furnace was put back into operation after a fifteen-year
lapse, but three years later Egery’s firm determined to
abandon direct management of the enterprise in favor of
leasing the property to another company that would run
the iron manufacturing operation.4
The leader of the new group, Owen W. Davis, Jr., was
characterized by a local newspaper as “a man o f great
energy and business capacity.”5 Davis was an enthusiastic
representative of the new managerial class which arose in
the United States in the years following the Civil War. He
lacked the financial assets o f men like David Pingree and
Thomas Egery, but he did have a keen eye for economic
opportunity and the ability to convince others to join him.
Even though Davis lacked the means to establish a large
industrial enterprise, he managed those he was given the
responsibility for with passion and dedication. By early in
1876 Davis had convinced four other Maine men to join
him, and they were incorporated as the Katahdin Iron
Company.
Rather than attempting to purchase the assets of the
Piscataquis Iron Works Company, Davis and his associates
leased all the property of Egery’s firm. While stock was
being sold in the new company and financing for the
renovation of the plant arranged, Davis traveled around
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the country, visiting all the major iron works. He then
immersed himself in a study of the latest technology and
production processes.6
By the time sufficient capital had been obtained, the
bulk o f it from long-term loans, Davis felt that he was
prepared to construct and operate a modern, efficient iron
manufacturing plant. Two turbine water wheels were
installed to replace the old wooden one. The extra power
produced was used to operate a huge new blowing
apparatus which enabled Davis to add ten feet to the
height of the furnace stack, increasing productive capacity
almost two and one-half times. A huge bell and hopper
were installed on the top o f the stack to capture waste
gases which could then be used to heat the air blast, raising
the efficiency o f the furnace. The second water turbine
powered an elevator that carried the ore, charcoal, and
limestone flux to the top of the heightened furnace.
Several new charcoal kilns were built to increase fuelproducing capacity to meet the new demands o f the
enlarged furnace. In addition, repairs and improvements
were made to the iron works village, and an old boarding
house was rebuilt and renamed a hotel in an effort to
attract tourists.7
Davis probably had the blast furnace in operation by late
1876, and he was soon facing the problem with the iron
sulphide ore which had given David Pingree so much
difficulty. Davis reported later:
. . . [The] ore was roasted in heaps, on piles of wood, and readily
yielded most of the combined water, and a large per cent of the
sulphur, and when fairly well roasted in this manner, it produced, with
ten per cent of lime and a hot furnace, a very handsome open-grained
iron, very soft and fluid . . . . But the action of the furnace was irregular,
and unsatisfactory: changes and slips being frequent and sudden, all
the iron above the grade of the soft No. IX . . . showing a lack of
strength, and an unhealthy fracture not to be expected in a good
charcoal iron. Occasional analyses of samples of iron sent away for test,
showed an excessive and unusual amount of silicon, which varied but
slightly in the different grades from No. 1 to white iron.8
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Davis’ problem was compounded in 1877 when the
beds of largely oxidized ore on the surface of the deposit
began to give out. The secondary layer o f ore was not as
fully oxidized as that on the surface, and thus contained
more sulphur, and in a sulphide form which could not be
oxidized by the traditional roasting method. When this
new ore was worked in the blast furnace, the results were
much more irregular and unsatisfactory than before.
Davis tried endless experim ents with the furnace,
changing the design of the interior, adding fifteen feet to
the height of the stack, and increasing the pressure of the
air blast, all to no avail.9
Undaunted, Davis turned his attention to improving the
facilities for roasting the ore before it was put into the blast
furnace. He constructed a series of permanent roasting
platforms, constructed of stone and iron, which permitted
more uniform oxidization o f the iron sulfide. When the
ore roasted in this manner was smelted in the remodeled
blast furnace, the quality o f the resultant pig iron was
improved and fuel consumption decreased.10 Convinced
that he was on the right track, Davis decided to continue
his experiments during the winter o f 1878:
It seemed apparent, at this time, that the outlook for the iron trade
was such as to encourage the belief in better times in the ensuing spring,
and to warrant some further effort at overcoming the difficulty; and it
was determined to make a thorough investigation into the causes of our
trouble, in the hope of removing them.
To accomplish this, a chemical laboratory was fitted up at the works,
and we were fortunate in securing the services of Mr. Ernst Sjostedt, of
Sweden, a graduate of the school of mines at Stockholm, to conduct the
investigation.
Complete analyses of ores, iron, fluxes, and cinders from recent and
former blasts were made, and it very soon became evident that our real
antagonist had been, not silicon, but sulphur, which met us on every
hand and in quantities much greater than anticipated. One analysis
after another confirmed the theory that the relation between sulphur
and silicon in our pig was very intimate . . . .n
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Davis and Sjostedt theorized that the high heat needed
in the furnace to make the sulphur combine with the lime
flux and pass o ff as slag, also made the silicon unite with
the iron rather than the flux. The obvious solution was to
attempt to remove all the sulphur from the ore before it
was smelted, so that a lower furnace temperature could be
used which would cause the silicon to pass o ff in the slag
rather than combine with the molten iron. Thus, the
roasting process would have to be still further improved in
order to heat all o f the ore to temperatures required to
break down the sulphide compound, and, in Davis’ words,
“do it uniformly, regularly, and on a large scale.”12
The logical next step after experimenting with the
roasting platforms was to build a large oven or kiln in
which the ore could be more precisely oxidized. Sjostedt,
assisted by George D. Colby, the agent at the iron works,
selected the Westerman kiln, widely used in Sweden, as a
model, and built a large cylindrical oven of brick, ten feet
in diameter at the bottom and five at the top, and
twenty-two feet high which was topped with a thiry-five
foot chimney four feet in diameter. The kiln was fired by
wood and the ore dumped into the stack through charging
doors near the base of the chimney from a trestle similar to
the one at the blast furnace.13
Tests of the new furnace showed that although the ore
was uniformly oxidized, some of the sulphur tended to
settle back on the ore and recombine with it. To overcome
this problem, a small flue, less than two feet in diameter
was built in the center o f the kiln, extending into the base
of the chimney. Three rows o f openings in this flue were
designed to draw o ff the sulphur as soon as it was oxidized
in order to prevent it from recombining with the ore.14
The center flue proved to be very effective, but several
more minor procedures were added to the roasting
process to ensure the effectiveness of the operation. The
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raw ore was sorted to remove any foreign matter and
broken into small lumps before being shoveled into the
furnace to insure that it would be uniformly heated.
Finally, the roasted ore was drawn from the kiln, while
still hot, directly into a trough of water to remove any
remaining sulphur.15
Davis reported on the results of the experimentation in
a paper read at the annual meeting of the United States
Association of Charcoal Iron Workers, October 20, 1880,
in Chambersburg, Pennsylvania:
This arrangement is now in use at our works, arid with results entirely
satisfactory.... [The] resulting pig is of superior quality, of great
strength, and shows a high chill, and it is selling freely for car wheels to
some of the largest car wheel shops in the country.,fi

The desulphurized ore not only produced a superior iron,
but also required less fuel. The furnace was turning out
fifteen to eighteen tons of pig iron per day using an
average of only eighty-three bushels of charcoal per ton,
an accomplishment which the Maine Mining Journal,
published in Bangor, boasted was “unprecedented in the
history of charcoal iron-making in this or any other
country.”17
Interest in the roasting kiln was sufficient for Davis and
Colby to patent the oven, and smelting experiments were
continued in spite of the success of the process. Davis
took the opportunity presented by a fire which halted
operations for a few weeks in June, 1881, to make a
number of improvements in machinery and methods
which resulted in an increase in monthly production from
500 to 600 tons. The following year, Davis purchased a
cargo of Spanish iron ore which could be obtained at
relatively low' cost due to the proximity of the deposits to
the sea and the number of vessels looking for ret urn cargo
to the United States, He undertook experiments to see if a
mixture of the rich, hard Spanish ore and the powdery
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native material would smelt more efficiently, and when the
tests proved successful, Davis ordered another shipment.18
In 1883, Davis and Colby designed and constructed a
gas furnace which they felt would heat the roasting kiln
more uniformly and economically. The specially adapted
furnace was built to burn worthless charcoal braize, an
annoying residue which accumulated from the charcoal in
the coal sheds, and thereby save some 15,000 cords of
wood annually along with the labor of two or three men.
The brick furnace was ten feet square at the base, six feet
at the top, and twenty feet in height. It was fired with a
blast o f air carried through a pipe from the main works,
and another funnel carried the gas formed by the burning
charcoal braize to the roasting kiln where it was used to
heat the ore.19
Davis also attempted to increase profits by moving into
the production o f iron castings. In the fall of 1882, he
began taking orders for cast iron railroad car draw bars
and mining machinery components, and he expressed the
hope that eventually the entire output of the blast furnace
could be turned into castings rather than the less
profitable pigs.20
After the smelting problem had been solved, however,
the main focus of Davis' attention was placed on the other
difficulty which had plagued the iron works from the
beginning - the high cost of transportation. Although the
distance over which the iron had to be transported by
relatively expensive horse and wagon had been reduced
from fifty to fifteen miles when a railroad was built from
Bangor to the nearby town of Milo, the hauling fee had
increased to $4.50 per ton, almost what it had cost to haul
it the entire distance in 1850.21
Davis concluded that the only way to reduce trans
portation costs was to extend the railroad to the iron
works. When the railroad company declined to build a
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branch line, Davis took the initiative and talked Thomas
Egery into organizing their own railroad. On June 20,
1881, the Bangor and Katahdin Iron Works Railway was
formed with a capital stock o f a mere $72,000. Davis was
elected president, and he made clear his determination to
build the road as expeditiously and economically as
possible. On June 10, even before the company was
organized, a civil engineer was surveying the proposed
route, and on July 29, ground had been broken and the
contractors had begun work.22
On the same date, the stock in the railroad had been
oversubscribed, and a prominent banker had offered a
premium for the first mortgage bonds. One year later,
before the line was fully completed, the last lot of bonds
were sold, closing out the entire issue of $100,000, all of
which sold at par and accrued interest, which the Maine
Mining Journal called "a fact almost or quite unparalleled
in the history of a new railroad enterprise.”23
In order to keep costs down, Davis built culverts and
bridge abutments o f wood rather than stone and
purchased used rails and rolling stock rather than new.
The rails were laid as far as the village o f Brownville, a few
miles below the iron works, by November, 1881, and
freight trains began running on that section the following
week. Construction began again in the spring, and by
September 15, 1882, trains were running through to the
iron works.24
The transportation problem had hardly been solved
when Davis was faced with a financial crisis. The failure of
a major creditor of the iron works in Portland forced the
firm into bankruptcy on November 25. A meeting of all
the major creditors was held four days later and after
listening to Davis, they voted their confidence in the
company and his leadership, and agreed to either accept
twelve cents on the dollar or capitalize the indebtedness. It
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is not clear which alternative was most utilized or what the
effect was on the control o f the firm, but the crisis was
quickly surmounted, and the iron works continued to
operate without interruption.25
Almost a year later, November 13, 1883, Davis was faced
with another crisis which could not be so easily dealt with.
A hurricane swept through northern New England,
inflicting heavy damage in Piscataquis County. It passed
just south of the iron works, and during the height of the
storm, debris from the charcoal kilns which had been
dumped on the river bank was fanned into flames. Sparks
were carried to the buildings and the iron works burned to
the ground. A local newspaper reported, “Nothing
escaped the conflagration except the blacksmith shop and
storehouse, although a part of the machinery and the tall
stone furnace stack were saved in a damaged condition.”26
The Katahdin Iron Company could not avoid failure this
time since the property was uninsured.
The prospects for rebuilding the iron works did not
look very promising after the fire since the property was
uninsured and many charcoal iron furnaces were idle
because o f low iron prices; undaunted, Davis immediately
began laying plans for the reconstruction of the works
while making the best o f the situation at hand by
harvesting the tremendous number of trees that had been
blown down in the storm. Two new saw mills were built,
and Davis was soon turning the toppled timber into spool
and match stock, and box boards. Later in the year, Egery
built a new shingle and clapboard mill, and soon the
products of this operation were being added to Davis'
freight of lumber and also pulp wood leaving on the iron
works railroad.27
George Colby resigned as agent in February, 1884, and
left for Port Leyden, New York, to take charge of the
extensive mines and works of the Geer Iron and Mining
Company.28 Davis, however, remained and began working
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for the reconstruction of the iron works as soon as his
temporary lumbering operations were completed. The
Maine Mining Journal, which had been renamed The
Industrial Journal, reported that Davis’ plans were based on
the requests of many of the company’s former customers;
. . . [The] Katahdin iron had established a reputation and a place for
itself in the market, and the demand for it continued notwithstanding
the supply had failed. The car wheel and machine shops in New
Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York and other states which had been
using the iron, among them some of the largest and best known in the
country, had come to consider it almost a necessity in their business,
and strongly urged the rebuilding of the works, as they were loath to
abandon an article which they had used with such satifactory results.
Mr. O.W. Davis, Jr., . . . was well satisfied that the iron would meet with
ready sale at prices ensuring a good margin over the cost of production,
with suitable facilities for manufacture.29

In May, 1885, Davis secured a new lease from the
Piscataquis Iron Works Company on more favorable
terms, giving him control o f the mines, timber, and other
property for fifty years. He then set out to interest the
businessmen of the Bangor area in forming a new stock
company to rebuild and operate the iron works on an
enlarged scale. Although some out-of-date companies
were reportedly interested in becoming associated with the
enterprise, Davis argued that control should be kept in
Bangor. The Industrial Journal, published there, called
Davis’ offer a simple business proposition. The iron works
was a proven success, the entire cost of operations could be
shown, and the margin of profit made apparent. The
market price, which was at its lowest point since 1878,
was known to be “at the lowest ebb of its periodic
fluctuations.”30
The businessmen of Bangor agreed with the Journal's
optimistic appraisal, and by the end of June the success of
Davis’ new undertaking was ensured. In July, the work of
clearing away the fire debris at the iron works began, and
Davis rehired Ernst Sjostedt, this time to serve as agent.

On July 31, the Katahdin Charcoal Iron Company was
officially organized in Bangor, and Davis was elected
general manager. He and the other officers reported that
the capital of the new concern was sufficient to rebuild the
works in a substantial manner and that “the fires o f the
furnace are expected to be burning before snow flies.”31
Davis may have been secretly gratefu l fo r the
destruction o f the iron works for it gave him an
opportunity to rebuild almost from scratch, making
whatever changes and modifications he felt necessary. O f
course, the stone blast furnace stack, and brick roasting
kiln had survived with little damage, and the brick
charcoal kilns were intact. But the rest of the plant was
almost a total loss, including the dam which had been
carried away by high water earlier in the year.32
Davis built a new and more substantial dam and a flume
of heavy masonry to carry the water to the machine house.
The huge turbine water wheels and auxiliary steam
engines, which Davis had installed for use in times o f low
water, were saved, repaired, and put back into operation.
New coal sheds were built along with several new charcoal
kilns to increase productive capacity. The blast furnace
was relined and the fire brick core was again extended
some fifteen feet above the furnace to increase its size.
Rather than heat the air blast at the top o f the heightened
furnace stack, Davis built a hot blast oven on the ground
beside it, enabling the air to be piped directly from the
blast machinery, through the oven, and into the blast
furnace. A mammoth bell and hopper was placed on the
top o f the stack to collect the hot waste gases and direct
them through a huge conductor to the hot blast oven on
the ground. A branch pipe carried some o f the gases to a
new roasting kiln designed to use them as fuel.33
Although the general layout o f the new works was
similar to the old plant, modifications were made so that
every building was in the most convenient position for
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utmost efficiency of operation. Most o f the new structures
were of frame construction sided with corrugated iron and
roofed with sheet iron to give excellent protection against
another fire. A new enlarged casting house was con
structed and, on the opposite side of the furnace, a
two-story building through which a double-compartmented elevator shaft extended to the top of the stack.
On the first floor o f this structure the roasted ores and
fluxes were mixed in the proper proportions for charging
the furnace, and the second story was connected by a
platform with coal sheds on the bank behind. Two new
safety elevators carried the ore, flux, and charcoal to
the top of the stack where it was fed into the furnace. A
limestone crusher was installed near the machine house
and the old de-sulphurizing kiln was used to roast the
crushed lime rock. By the end of November, the iron
works was complete, and with its new innovations,
arrangements and modifications Davis believed he would
be able to turn out more quality iron at less expense than
ever before.34
Later in the month representatives o f the Bethlehem
Iron and Steel Works and the Reading Iron Works visited
the Katahdin Iron Works in order to inspect the new plant
and especially the new roasting kiln. The visitors were
impressed by the roasting process and complimented
Davis on the efficiency of its operation.35
In the early spring of 1886, with the reconstructed plant
working smoothly and efficiently, and orders for iron
coming in well ahead of production, Davis left for a trip
through the West where he made numerous sales of
iron.36 A year later the United States Navy purchased a
shipment of Katahdin pig to be used in making cylinders
for the steam engines o f some new cruisers then under
construction.37 In September, 1887, Davis suggested
increasing the diameter o f the furnace hearth and stack in
order to further increase the capacity o f the furnace, and
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when the major stockholders agreed, the work was
completed ahead of schedule.38
In November, 1886, Davis had been elected vicepresident of the National Association of Charcoal Iron
Workers at their annual meeting in Philadelphia.39
This was to be the last public recognition Davis would
receive, and it was a hollow one at that since his furnace
was one of only about fifty small charcoal furnaces that
remained o f the hundreds which had supplied the bulk of
American iron before 18 5 5.40 In December, 1888, two
young Bangor businessmen, Charles D. Stamford and
Fred W. Hill, purchased a controlling interest in the
Katahdin Charcoal Iron Company and took an active role
in the management o f the firm, shunting Davis aside.
Although Stam ford and Hill appear to have been
optimistic about the future o f the iron works initially, and
the demand for the Katahdin pig iron remained good, the
new managers must have soon come to the conclusion that
a charcoal iron furnace could not be made profitable, no
matter how modern and efficient it was.41 On March 21,
1890, the Industrial Journal reprinted without comment
this cryptic epitaph for the iron works from the Piscataquis
Observer:
Work will be suspended at the Katahdin Iron Works in a week or two,
the kilns having been filled for the last time. No wood has been cut this
year. There are various opinions as to the ore supply, but it is a fact that
it costs more to get it than the prices received for it warrant. Various
parties have at different times attempted to operate these works but
none of them have ever made any considerable amount of money, and
several have sunk a good deal.42

Owen W. Davis, Jr ., had accomplished some remarkable
things while managing the Katahdin Iron Works. He had
solved a complex smelting problem, built a railroad to
reduce transportation costs, introduced innumerable
improvements in plant and procedure, and, perhaps most
remarkable, successfully organized a second iron company
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after the first had twice failed. Ironically, the name of that
second firm contained its own epitaph - charcoal - for
charcoal iron furnaces were obsolescent. Owen Davis,
despite his remarkable achievements, was bound to fail.
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